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“Positive feedback” is one of those phrases that sounds like it ought to mean something good, when it actually
means something that is almost always bad: a runaway process whose output forces its inputs further in the direction
they are already headed. A chain reaction in an atomic bomb is a classic example, where the production of neutrons
is proportional to the number of atoms split, which is in turn proportional to the number of neutrons. Of course, a
bomb is one of the few cases where the goal is to produce a runaway process. Even in this case, positive feedback has
the property that it quickly destroys the conditions that made the positive feedback possible. This is a hallmark of the
breed. Take any other example, such as the multiplication of rabbits, whose output—rabbits—is proportional to the
number of rabbits. This simple model assumes that food is abundant; the exponentially increasing rabbit population
soon violates that assumption.
In Ray Kurzweil’s book, The Singularity is Near, it is argued that the evolution of humanity and technology is
driven by a positive feedback, and that the resulting destruction of many of the truths we hold dear will result in
a post-human world of wonders. It’s hard to argue with the claim that a positive feedback is going on, especially
after Kurzweil has pounded the point home with graph after graph; and so it is hard to disagree that this feedback
will destroy the conditions that make the feedback possible (see above). Such arguments have driven pessimists
from Malthus to Gore to conclude that humanity is in for some stormy weather. Kurzweil, however, believes that
evolution has always managed to avoid the consequences of its manias by leapfrogging from one medium to another.
Genetic evolution produced cultural evolution and now cultural evolution will produce a new phase in which people
gradually replace themselves with bio-mechanical hybrids, where the seams between the carbon-based and silicon-
based parts will be blurred by the nanobots crawling through them. At this point our new incarnations will begin to
guide their own evolution, presumably toward ever more complex technological embodiments. Our future selves will
be superintelligent, able to merge with others in ways that will cause our current conceptions of individuality to break
down. Because all our assumptions about what happens past that point break down, he calls it the Singularity.
It’s hard not to picture the Borg from Star Trek when thinking about Kurzweil’s vision of post-human beings
swimming through silicon. It was generally assumed in Star Trek that assimilation into the Borg was to be avoided,
although none of the assimilated ever complained. Kurzweil can hardly wait. He is even watching his health to make
sure he survives to the year 2045, which is roughly when the Singularity will be consummated. He acknowledges that
there are perils in the technologies he visualizes, including especially AI, but he is confident humanity can conquer
them.
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world-ecological analogue of too many rabbits; or whether political mechanisms will defeat the forces pushing us
toward post-humanity; or whether transition into the new world order would be an improvement on the human race or
the irreparable annihilation of something beautiful (or both). What seems appropriate to discuss, given the venue for
this review, is where AI fits into all this.
First, let me sketch the role that Kurzweil thinks AI will play. He is an AI practitioner with solid credentials,
having been the first person to have brought many pattern-recognition technologies to market. He believes that any
talk of AI having “failed” in the 1980s is hogwash, an artifact of the usual bubble that accompanies the arrival of
new technologies, which invariably overexcite the public. Instead, he sees AI flourishing everywhere. However, he
describes existing AI systems as “narrow”, and looks forward to the day that “strong AI” is here. Strong AI is defined
as “aptitude resembling the broad, deep, and subtle features of human intelligence, particularly its powers of pattern
recognition and command of language” (p. 92).1
It’s odd that he chose the adjective “strong”, since he says he means “broad and deep”, and he uses “narrow” as its
opposite. It’s almost as if he wants to mess up the terms introduced by John Searle, “weak” and “strong AI”. Searle’s
strong AI is not an aptitude but a philosophical position, that mind can be explained entirely in terms of computation.
I don’t really mind the injection of confusion into Searle’s basically absurd2 dichotomy, but there is always the danger
that Kurzweil will suffer from the blowback of having his terms taken as somehow having a Searlian sense.
This issue, of how to get from narrow to strong AI, is of concern to others besides Kurzweil. At a recent symposium
of AAAI Fellows, held in conjunction with the fiftieth anniversary of Dartmouth, there were several discussion groups
on topics such as “Can we design an architecture for human-level intelligence?” and “Can we build a never-ending
natural language learner?” (If we could, it could learn all it needed to know by reading the World Wide Web, although
it could end up with a mighty odd set of beliefs.) There was a palpable sense of impatience in the air; we’ve been
working on this for fifty years, and accomplished so much; shouldn’t we be a bit further along? Personally, I think this
impatience is misguided. We’ve achieved a steady rate of progress that we can be proud of, and it will eventually reach
the goal. We may never come up with a satisfying theory of superhuman intelligence, but we (and our compatriots in
other branches of cognitive science) will come up with a theory of average human intelligence, and that will be quite
a feat.
Ray Kurzweil has no doubts about AI—at least, not about its likelihood of producing a theory of superintelligence.
“The most powerful impending revolution is . . . [robotics]: human-level robots with their intelligence derived from
our own but redesigned to far exceed human capabilities. [Robotics] represents the most significant transformation,
because intelligence is the most powerful ‘force’ in the universe. Intelligence, if sufficiently advanced, is, well, smart
enough to anticipate and overcome any obstacles in its path” (p. 206). He does have doubts, or musings anyway, about
whether the superintelligent computers will be conscious; I’ll come back to this topic.
In this journal, it may seem bad form to take issue with Kurzweil’s argument that AI is inevitable—practically
already here—but in fact I found it surprisingly weak. The argument is repeated several times, but not really amplified
on. It boils down to these points:
1. Given Moore’s Law3 and other indications of exponential technological progress, we will soon equal and surpass
whatever computational power the brain might possess (pp. 124ff, 147, 167ff).
2. To duplicate human intelligence, it is sufficient to duplicate the structure of all the neurons in the brain. To
reproduce a particular individual’s persona may require very fine-grained duplication. Brain-scanning technology
is advancing at a rapid clip, so will soon get to that resolution (pp. 124, 162ff, 196ff, 265, 293, 439).
1 On p. 260, he defines it as “artificial intelligence that exceeds human intelligence”, which is not quite the same thing. I will use the phrase in
the first sense, taking “strong AI” as approximately equivalent to human intelligence.
2 Searle’s seemingly attractive “weak AI” position is in fact incoherent. Those who create computational models of mind while claiming to
reserve judgment on the true nature of what they’re modeling are either kidding themselves or are modeling something noncomputational; I have
yet to see or hear of anyone in the latter group, unless someone has actually created a computational model of quantum coherence in microtubules
or cold fusion in the pineal gland.
3 The celebrated prediction by Gordon Moore [7] that the number of transistors on a chip would double every 18 months or so; Kurzweil interprets
this loosely to mean that computational power from whatever source will continue to grow exponentially.
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brain function at a “software” level, that is, understand what a piece of brain is computing and compute that by
using whatever device is most convenient (pp. 145, 148, 153, 178ff, 440).
4. Computers won’t suffer from human limitations, so as soon as they get level with people4 in intelligence, they will
“soar past them”. One reason is that once you have an intelligent system, you can make many copies. Another is
that intelligent machines will have access to all the world’s databases, as well as to each other (so they can share
what they know and work on problems in teams). Machines have faster components and bigger memories, and
they don’t suffer from fatigue (pp. 26, 145, 260, 261).
The page references after each item in this list are to the many places where each part is restated. The book’s repeti-
tiveness is enough to put the reader into a deep coma. A good editor would have cut it by two-thirds.
I of course agree with Kurzweil that the brain is essentially a computer, in the sense that what it does for its owner
is compute things (just as what hearts do for their owners is pump blood). But a powerful computer to compute X will
not compute Y no matter how much you boost its power. So Moore’s Law by itself doesn’t get us anywhere. Kurzweil
knows this, and the other prongs of his argument can be read as meeting this objection.
The second part of the argument is that the brain can be physically duplicated. The emphasis is on brain scan-
ning: “Scanning and sensing tools are doubling their overall spatial and temporal resolution each year. . . . We have
demonstrated that our ability to build detailed models and working simulations of subcellular portions, neurons, and
extensive neural regions follows closely upon the availability of the requisite tools and data” (p. 197). At what detail
do we need to scan? To build an intelligent copy of the brain might, Kurzweil speculates, require scanning at the level
of cortical regions, whereas, “. . . if we want to ‘upload’ a particular person’s personality . . . , then we may need to sim-
ulate neural processes at the level of individual neurons, such as the soma . . . , axon . . . , dendrites . . . , and synapses
. . . . For this we need to look at detailed models of individual neurons. The ‘fan out’ . . . per neuron is estimated at 103.
With an estimated 1011 neurons, that’s about 1014 connections. With a reset time of five milliseconds, that comes to
about 1016 synaptic transactions per second” (p. 124).
These humongous numbers are piled up only to make it all the more impressive that Moore’s Law, another friendly
exponential process, will overcome them. Whether or not you find that plausible, it’s clear that being able to scan
neurons down to the level of quarks would by itself not get us that far toward achieving machine intelligence. There
are two reasons for this: (1) No matter how detailed a picture you had of the inside of a brain, you wouldn’t know
which details were important. (2) Even if you could duplicate a brain “down to the quarks,” all you would have
accomplished would be to duplicate that one brain. You wouldn’t have a theory that explained the computational
underpinnings of thought. These two points are closely related, but subtly distinct. The first objection, about knowing
what to copy, addresses the issue of how good brain scanning would have to be before you could confidently transmit
a copy of yourself somewhere. The second addresses the question whether the ability to transmit copies would tell
you much about how intelligence works.
Let me elaborate on the first point. Although we take for granted now that the brain is made of neurons that operate
by transmitting electrochemical signals along membranes and across synapses, the brain is actually a sloppy mess.
It’s only within the last 150 years that controversies about what kind of cells and connections exist were resolved.
We are now pretty sure that neurons are important, and that the more numerous glial cells are there only to play a
supporting role. So we don’t have to scan those. A 19th-century scientist contemplating copying down the human
brain would have assumed you have to copy the whole thing. What else can we neglect? Does it matter how many
vesicles are present at a synapse and exactly how much neurotransmitter is in each one, or can we average over them
somehow? But what about questions regarding the distribution of synapses? How much of the metabolic structure of
the cell can we neglect? Since there is a proposal on the table [3] that microtubules might be the site of quantum-
mechanical effects, I guess we have to scan those. Should we worry about the scan disturbing those quantum effects?
(They are said to be very easy to disturb!) Perhaps there are effects like that elsewhere; perhaps there are holographic
interference patterns running across the cortex that we haven’t looked for and so haven’t found; if you scan under
circumstances when the patterns aren’t just so, you’ll miss the important stuff.
4 More precisely, above-average people like scientists and engineers (p. 262).
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about what neurons compute and how. Since understanding the brain at the computational level is the whole game
for the field of AI, why does brain scanning get so much of Kurzweil’s attention? Obviously improvements in brain-
scanning technology are important and exciting, but they get us somewhere only if accompanied by deepening of
our understanding of the computations neurons do. So the possibility of scanning is a very weak argument that our
understanding is sure to deepen.
The second objection is that even if we succeeded in duplicating a person to the point where we couldn’t tell the
copy from the original, that wouldn’t even confirm AI, let alone contribute to it. We have to be careful to distinguish
AI from materialism in general. The latter is the doctrine that, as philosophers put it, “the mental supervenes on the
material”: What physical state a creature is in completely determines its mental state. AI, which in this context also
goes by the name “computationalism”, is a much stronger doctrine that “the mental supervenes on the computational”,
i.e., that (a) there is such a thing as the computational state of a creature, which can be characterized independently
of the physical substrate used to implement it; and (b) what computational state a system is in completely determines
its mental state.5 My point is that the ability to make perfect copies of a person would confirm only materialism, not
computationalism.
Kurzweil is a smart person, and he understands these objections. After the quote above, he continues, “The
performance of neurons and subcellular portions of neurons often involves substantial complexity and numerous non-
linearities, but the performance of neural clusters and neuronal regions is often simpler than their constituent parts”
(p. 197). Clearly, this observation can be true only if there is a computational level of description of pieces of brain
that abstracts away from many details of how the computation is performed. Most readers of this journal will have no
trouble agreeing, and will share Kurzweil’s enthusiasm for computational models of mental functions, some directly
inspired by the physiology of the brain, some less so. It’s not so clear that the word “software” is appropriate for
describing the computations the brain does; or for describing any other aspect of the brain. He defines the “software of
intelligence” on p. 145 as “the organization and content of these resources”—“these resources” being the “hardware
computational capacity” of the brain. One might decide that this way of drawing a line between “hardware” and “soft-
ware” is basically harmless, but I often wish that people could just stop trying to impose categories from technology
on biological systems where they are simply inappropriate. The lay reader, including the average journalist, will come
away from books like these with some vague sense that the brain is sort of like a digital computer that has something
sort of like programs—somewhere. They probably got a similar impression from something else they read a couple
of years back, so the misconception just lives on.
Anyway, laying this issue aside, the key question is whether the successes in brain modeling and AI provide
evidence that strong AI is in the offing. Here is an edited copy of Kurzweil’s list of the successes to date:
• Lloyd Watts’s model of the human auditory system.
• Hebbs’s model of learning in neurons, and related models by more recent researchers.
• Detailed computational models of the cerebellum.
• Poggio’s work on the visual system.
• A rapidly growing set of commercial applications.
• Cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
• Mars-exploring robots.
• The model-based reasoner aboard the Deep Space One spacecraft.
• Various pattern-recognition systems, including several developed by Kurzweil and his associates. For instance,
electrocardiograms are now routinely scanned by machine for signs of heart problems.
• The “robot scientist” of [4] that designs and carries out experiments in biology (using the results to design new
experiments).
• The proof of the Robbins Algebra conjecture (which had gone unsolved for decades).
• The success of several autonomous vehicles on the 2005 “DARPA grand challenge”, completing a 131.2-mile
course in the Mojave desert.
• Google.
5 There are enough technical flaws with these formulations to keep several philosophers employed for a month fixing them; but I was not provided
with a budget for this.
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• Machine translation—at a level that is commercially viable if not perfect.
I have winnowed Kurzweil’s list by eliminating programs whose descriptions have a whiff of hype to them. Others
would draw the line slightly differently, I’m sure, and I apologize to anyone whose feelings are hurt by my choices
one way or the other.
So, the question is, does this list of successes, which all seem to me to fall in the category of “narrow” AI, add up
to an argument that “strong” AI is inevitable? I’m willing to believe they do. But I believed it before I read the book
(or rather I accepted it as a working hypothesis). Why would a skeptic be convinced? Well, on page 439 we get a
paragraph headed “The Ultimate Source of Intelligent Algorithms,” which says, “The most important point . . . is that
there is a specific game plan for achieving human-level intelligence in a machine: reverse engineer the . . . methods
used in the human brain . . . .” We’re back to scanning, or perhaps “mining”, the brain again. If that doesn’t convince
you, think about Moore’s Law again, or meditate on the possibility of intelligent algorithms bootstrapping their way
to superintelligence. Still puzzled? Go back over that list of successes of narrow AI . . . .
Let’s take a deep breath and try to get back on the path, and go on to the part of the argument we have yet to
examine: the idea that once we achieve “strong AI” we will “soar” on to what I will call superstrong AI. Once more,
I don’t think the case is proven. The problem is that we might get to strong AI in more than one way. We might
asymptotically approach human intelligence, adding mental abilities one by one until we reach a reasonable facsimile
of an average person; or research might build steam and burst through that ceiling quickly. Or it might be the case that
superstrong AI is achieved by the inevitable momentum that computers will derive from their inherent advantages over
biological systems once they reach the neighborhood of human intelligence. This last scenario is the one Kurzweil
wants to argue for. I listed computers’ advantages above: they can be duplicated, they can share information, they
don’t get tired, and they have big memories and fast components. Plus (p. 28), “Machine intelligence will improve its
own abilities in a feedback cycle that unaided human intelligence will not be able to follow”. The last argument is,
alas, circular, as far as I can see. Until machine intelligence gets past the human level, it won’t be able to do all that
smart stuff.
Do the listed powers of computers really allow us to bootstrap from ordinary strong AI to the superstrong variety?
Who knows? Copying a fairly smart computer exactly several times might lead to a committee of fairly smart com-
puters that tended to agree on mundane solutions to problems. Having access to huge amounts of information might
result in a system overwhelmed by trivia. One’s confidence is not inspired by statements such as these: “Machines
have exacting memories. Contemporary computers can master billions of facts accurately, a capability that is doubling
every year” (p. 261). It’s not clear what definitions of “fact” and “master” Kurzweil is using here, but they can’t be
what we normally mean we say a person has mastered a fact.
For Kurzweil it seems fairly obvious that human intelligence is an arbitrary level along a one-dimensional scale; it’s
the “level . . . sufficient to enable us to outwit the competitors in our ecological niche . . .” (p. 152). But “intelligence”
is a slippery concept. Academics tend to regard themselves as smart people, but at a gathering of professors from
different departments it becomes clear quickly that outside their areas of expertise they can often be quite thick.
And it’s parochial to suppose that the kinds of brains academics pride themselves on are the only important kind.
We evolved as hunter-gatherers, and had to develop incredibly quick wits to survive. How many graduate students,
plunked down in the savanna, could earn the equivalent of a Ph.D. in paleolithic survival skills?
On p. 265, Kurzweil compares intelligence to Bernoulli’s principle:
It’s the nature of technology to understand a phenomenon and then engineer systems that concentrate and focus that
phenomenon to greatly amplify it. For example, scientists discovered a subtle property of curved surfaces known
as Bernoulli’s principle: a gas (such as air) travels more quickly over a curved surface than over a flat surface. Thus,
air pressure over a curved surface is lower than over a flat surface. By understanding, focusing, and amplifying the
implications of this subtle observation, our engineering created all of aviation. Once we understand the principles
of intelligence, we will have a similar opportunity to focus, concentrate, and amplify its powers.
Here’s what wrong with this analogy: It may well be true that there are principles underlying “ordinary” thinking.
Indeed, it’s this assumption that gives us reason to believe that a sufficient stock of narrow AI skills will get us to
strong AI. But Kurzweil wants to burst through the ordinary level and “focus and amplify” intelligence to the point
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Are there really principles of intelligence that would support limitless insight the way Bernoulli’s principle supports
the design of various kinds of lifting surfaces? It just seems to me that intelligence can’t be boxed in that way. Sure,
there can be principles underlying the kinds of intelligence that have already appeared, and as cognitive scientists we
believe such principles exist and are being steadily, if slowly, mapped. But to say one creature is more intelligent than
another in some regard is to say that it can see connections the other can’t. The kinds of connections there are between
different things in the universe could be, for all we know, inexhaustible. Suppose we define a “genius” as someone
who taps into a new kind of connection, one that, almost by definition, transcends existing sets of principles. Our sense
of excitement at the prospect of the future intellectual development of humanity is sustained by our hope that we will
keep producing geniuses, and so keep making new connections and escaping the bounds imposed by principles.
I am not proposing that geniuses violate the basic assumptions of cognitive science, that their brains do things that
can’t be explained as computations. If we “reverse engineer” the brain of the next Richard Feynman, I am willing to
grant that we will understand how she arrives at solutions to problems that other people struggle even to formulate
properly. But it simply doesn’t follow that after reverse engineering any number of brilliant brains we will then know
how to produce all possible brilliant brains.6
My conclusion is that Kurzweil does not make his case for strong, or superstrong, AI. As I said at the outset, I won’t
address the ecological or political ramifications of his book.
But there is one other aspect that I find somewhat discordant given his faith in the continued progress of AI,
and that is his attitude toward consciousness. He believes that there is a hard distinction between the subjective
and the objective, and that “there exists no objective test that can determine its presence”, that is, the presence of
consciousness. (Page 378, emphasis in original.) Furthermore, there is no obvious reason why “my” consciousness is
associated with “my” body. To mix one of Kurzweil’s examples with a scenario due to William James, if Kurzweil
and Alanis Morrissette are in the same room, what links the stream of Kurzweil’s experiences to the body with that
name? Why don’t the streams of consciousness get mixed up, or switch, so that some of the time the experiences of
the singer are connected to the body of the inventor?
These questions sound like those of a classical dualist, but if so we’re talking about a very confused dualist. Dualists
traditionally want to believe that the events taking place in the stream of experiences influence the actions performed
by the bodies they’re attached to. I7 don’t just experience a moldy taste when I bite into an old piece of cheese found
in the refrigerator; the experience drives me to spit it out and find something to wash the taste out of my mouth. But
if you’re a materialist, and Kurzweil is, then all the events causing me to spit and then grab for a Diet Dr. Pepper
Berries and Cream soda are taking place in my body. Therefore it only seems as if the subjective experience is causing
anything. This position is called “epiphenomenalism”, and, though Kurzweil doesn’t explicitly endorse it, I suppose
that’s where he ends up. But it’s a scary position for a Singularitarian to be in. He says
Consciousness is the most important ontological question. After all, if we truly imagine a world in which there
is no subjective experience (a world in which there is swirling stuff but no conscious entity to experience it), that
world may as well not exist (p. 380).
One page earlier he writes
. . . We cannot safely dismiss the question of consciousness as merely a polite philosophical concern. It is at the core
of society’s legal and moral foundation. The debate will change when a machine—nonbiological intelligence—can
persuasively argue on its own that it/he/she has feelings that need to be respected. Once it can do so with a sense
of humor—which is particularly important for convincing others of one’s humanness—it is likely that the debate
will be won (p. 379).
Wait a minute. There is no objective test for subjectivity. Over and over Kurzweil says merely claiming to have
experience wouldn’t prove you do. The only exception he’s willing to grant is when you have a brain that works with
6 The point is elaborated in Chapter 2 of [5].
7 Following Kurzweil’s lead, I emphasize the subjectivity involved in the example by putting it in the first person.
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a sense of humor actually had experiences. Worse, the only way it could possibly have experiences is if one of those
streams of consciousness got created and attached to it the way Alanis Morrissette has hers attached. Yet we should
upload ourselves into machines like that, possibly ceasing to experience anything, and risk putting the universe into a
state where it might as well not exist?8
This position is hopelessly incoherent, and mainly interesting as a snapshot of the confusion of a typical scientist
trying to think about this issue. However, there is no need for alarm. I have confidence that our successes in narrow AI
will soon be joined by successes in “narrow consciousness” as we come to understand how the brain models itself as
having experiences, and to understand how machines could do the same. These successes will eventually culminate
in a theory of “strong consciousness” that completely explains consciousness computationally, without the need for
a mysterious quality called “subjectivity”, and without any puzzles about whether people’s streams of consciousness
can come unglued. For some arguments to this effect see [1,2,5,6].
One last appeal. Although I don’t think Kurzweil has proved his case about AI (and I have had nothing to say about
his arguments on genetics, nanotechnology, politics, or ecology), he may be right. But right or wrong, I wish he would
stop writing these books! The field of AI is periodically plagued by “hype hurricanes” that seem to surge up from the
slightest perturbation. We came dangerously close to a calamity with “agent technology”, which was all the rage for
a couple of years in spite of not actually existing; fortunately, that ripple seems to have died down without getting
beyond the tropical-depression stage. Most of these storms are started or spun up by journalists, venture capitalists,
or defense-department bureaucrats. But there are a very small number of people within the field of AI who contribute
to the problem, and Kurzweil is the worst offender. He may think that the Singularity is such a world-shattering event
that we should be thinking about it even if the chance of its happening is small, and that the possible damage done
to AI is a trifle by comparison. Furthermore, if overhyping AI now causes all the funding to be sucked out of the
field for a few years, his charts show that such events are negligible glitches in an inexorable exponential march. But
his negligible glitch could be somebody else’s wrecked career. This business is tough enough without us shooting
ourselves in the foot. Holster your gun, Ray!
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